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SUMMARY 
 
This report explores transactions costs in the context of agri-environmental 
policy schemes based on management agreements, taking the Environmentally 
Sensitive Areas (ESAs) scheme as a case-study.  While transactions costs are 
interpreted as encompassing the whole range of organisational costs of 
economic systems, the focus here is on the public, administrative costs of 
policy implementation as a sub-set.  If agri-environmental schemes based on 
voluntary, compensated management agreements with landowners are to be 
extended in future, policy budgeting and evaluation should take into account 
the non-trivial costs of organisation, and the factors affecting the magnitude of 
such costs. 
 
Empirical administrative cost functions were explored using panel data 
spanning five years for the 22 English ESAs.  Participation rates were found to 
be important in explaining administrative cost variability across areas and 
regional administering agencies. The types of activity needed in relation to 
participation at different stages of the scheme’s life are important explanators 
of cost levels.  However, the influence of activity-related factors on costs must 
be untangled from the contribution to administrative cost reduction related to 
factors such as economies of scale and the effects of experience and fine-tuning 
to reap administrative economies.  Other characteristics of ESAs such as their 
location within Less Favoured Areas and the number of years since their 
designation are also associated with differences in the organisational costs of 
ESAs.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The management of land for primary production in the UK is driven 
mainly by the aims and objectives of farmers and foresters with regard to 
the level and stability of their incomes.  The level of agricultural support 
in the EU is thought to have led to rising levels of intensity of land use in 
recent decades, threatening widely-valued characteristics of the 
countryside.  Although historically the provision of environmental goods 
has been largely taken for granted as an automatic side-effect of 
production, a common belief now is that environmental and amenity 
public goods are no longer produced jointly with primary products.  
Hence the development of policies seeking to encourage their provision. 
 
The main financial cost component for many agri-environmental 
schemes across the EU at present, such as those implemented under 
Regulation 2078/92 and Regulation 746/96, relates to land-holder 
compensation for adherence to environmental management agreements1.  
However, the gross public exchequer costs encompass both payments to 
farmers and the organisational costs of scheme operation, which are 
incurred in both the public and the private sectors.  Whereas only some 
agri-environmental schemes involve payments to farmers, all schemes, 
regardless of their type, cause administrative costs to be incurred by the 
implementing agency.  Such costs are a potentially substantial 
component of the total policy costs borne by the public exchequer, and 
consideration  of  them  should,  therefore,  be  an   important  element  in  
                                                 
1
 The implementation of some schemes may also induce indirect changes in exchequer 
costs for other policies, such as agricultural commodity supports, so the net costs of a 
scheme should be calculated and used in any evaluation (see Saunders 1996). 
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policy decision-making.  For example, there may be barriers to 
participation in voluntary agri-environmental schemes if farmers have to 
bear significant transactions costs related to making the initial enquiries 
or related to actual participation.  The existence of cost-barriers may 
jeopardise the achievement of policy objectives2.  So, the question, how 
can transactions costs be reduced, is a critical one in the agri-
environmental sphere, particularly given the dominance at present of 
voluntary schemes. 
 
Most governments currently fail to report the organisational costs of 
scheme implementation, hiding a significant element of scheme costs.  
This has the potential, consequently, of failing to ensure the best value 
for money for tax-payers.  While the existence of administrative costs 
does not imply government failure, there is certainly a problem of 
invisibility at present.  It is unusual to find policy evaluations in the agri-
environmental literature which include them, despite widespread 
recognition of their importance (see, for example, Stavins 1993)3.  
Contrastingly, transactions cost analysis is well-advanced in areas such 
as agricultural land-leasing (see, for example, Nerlove 1996, and Allen & 
Lueck 1996) and food marketing chains (for example, Loader 1996) and 
also, increasingly, in the health management literature (for example, 
Ashton 1998).  The underlying concern of this research is with the 
tendency to systematically under-state the crucial role of organisation, 
                                                 
2
 Some ESAs require farmers to draw up a conservation plan, at their own expense, 
before management contracts may be made.  However, the size of any associated legal 
and surveying costs is currently unknown. 
3
 McCann & Easter (1998) carried out some empirical estimation of transactions costs 
for schemes to reduce phosphorous pollution. Whitby & Saunders (1996) for some 
analysis with regard to ESAs and SSSIs.  A substantial amount of empirical 
transactions cost data has now been collected for agri-environmental schemes across 
eight EU member states; see Falconer & Whitby (1999). 
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i.e., transactions, within the policy system (and the related resource use), 
in most economic analyses of the provision of public goods.  The 
transactional sphere in agri-environmental policy has received only slight 
empirical attention in the economic policy evaluation literature to date.  
Assessment is needed of the type and magnitude of administrative costs 
involved in policy implementation, the factors affecting them, and the 
implications of such costs for policy development.   
 
In a world of scarce resources, organisational costs should be minimised 
whilst maintaining sufficient levels of activity to fulfil the objectives of 
the policy.  The costs of agri-environmental schemes to public 
administrations are of growing contemporary importance in practical 
policy-making discussion; see, for example, the recent National Audit 
Office report (NAO 1997), which considered the organisational 
effectiveness of Environmentally Sensitive Areas (ESAs).  This report 
was followed by a hearing on whether the administrative costs involved 
were too high. Although agri-environmental policy accounts for only a 
small proportion of overall public expenditure at present, its share looks 
set to expand in the future, hence the importance of assessing as 
accurately as possible the resource implications, including organisational 
aspects, of policy development under different scenarios. The 
identification of factors related to relatively high or low administrative 
costs could aid reductions in scheme costs to be made while still 
allowing policy goals to be achieved. 
 
The focus in this research is on schemes based on voluntary management 
agreements between the state and private producers, which are the 
dominant policy approach at present across the EU.  Section 2 examines 
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the nature of agri-environmental transactions; a conceptual analysis of 
agri-environmental organisation is then developed in Section 3, and used 
as a basis for the development of an empirical model of the 
administrative costs of the English ESA scheme as a case-study.  Section 
4 presents the results of some preliminary econometric work, and Section 
5 discusses the findings in their broader context.  Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. TRANSACTIONS COSTS ANALYSIS FOR AGRI-  
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
 
The current situation in the EU is one of the perceived under-supply of 
agri-environmental goods.  It would be useful, therefore, to understand 
why under-provision exists (and persists), and then to ask how provision 
could be increased.  A starting point for agri-environmental policy 
analysis lies in the breakdown of classical contracting for agri-
environmental goods.  An externality exists when the private economy 
lacks incentives to set up a market for a good (i.e., the costs of change 
exceed the anticipated gains), and when the non-existence of this market 
results in a Pareto sub-optimal resource allocation.  Transactions costs 
are fundamental to the existence of externalities, presenting barriers to 
the efficient resolution of conflict through the market mechanism. 
 
In the broadest sense, transactions costs may be defined to encompass all 
those costs that cannot be conceived to exist in a ‘Robinson Crusoe’ 
economy where neither property rights nor transactions, nor any kind of 
economic organisation can be found (Cheung 1987).  Arrow (1969) 
defined transactions costs to be the costs of running the economic 
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system.  Niehans (1971) defined them as those costs that arise not from 
the production of goods, but from their transfer from one to another.  At 
root are the information deficiencies faced by one or both of the 
transacting parties, and the costs of removing such deficiencies 
(Dahlman 1979, 1980).  The chief reason for their existence is the degree 
of heterogeneity of the characteristics of the type of commodity to be 
exchanged; hence, for example, the need for monitoring and compliance 
enforcement, given the presence of opportunism. 
 
Free-market exchange of agri-environmental assets between individuals 
is often prohibitively expensive, given the high search costs and co-
ordination costs where the agri-environmental goods and services 
demanded are produced in non-separable ways by different land-owners 
(for example, landscape).  Information costs are high given 
characteristics such as the variable, often highly location-specific, nature 
of agricultural production technology and opportunity costs, and the 
variable natural heritage value of any parcel of land and the potential to 
increase it.  The complexity of the management required for both 
agricultural and natural heritage production, and the low observability of 
much management, also contributes to high information costs.  
Information asymmetry gives rise to significant problems.  Variability in 
the attitudes (objective functions) of each individual land-owner means 
that there will be different levels of opportunism against which to 
safeguard.  The influence of stochastic environmental factors, such as 
weather conditions, also means that there is a level of uncertainty 
inherent in agri-environmental production.   
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These characteristics pose significant hurdles to private contracting with 
regard to agri-environmental goods and services, leaving resource use 
conflicts frequently unresolved.  Furthermore, the transactions costs that 
inhibited free-market provision of goods will also have implications for 
the cost-effectiveness of policy mechanisms to provide them, as the 
nature of the goods remain unchanged.  If transactions costs are zero, the 
form of economic organisation will not influence resource allocation: 
firms and markets will be equally efficient  (see Coase 1960, Williamson 
1985).  However, the real world of course, is characterised by positive 
transactions costs: hence, designers and evaluators of economic systems 
should take them into account, since their omission from the decision 
calculus could well result in sub-optimal policies.   
 
Given positive transactions costs, the form of economic organisation 
must be chosen carefully if efficiency is to be achieved.  For economic 
efficiency, that scheme or mix of schemes which minimises total costs - 
i.e., scheme compliance costs (the opportunity costs of producing agri-
environmental goods) and administrative costs - should be chosen (see 
Williamson 1985).  However, there are likely to be different trade-offs 
between these two components under different scheme organisational 
structures: consideration of either component in isolation may mean that 
the policy framework develops in a sub-optimal direction.  Since 
unknown organisational inefficiencies will probably not correct 
themselves, it would be very useful to understand and assess the 
determinants of policy-related transactions costs, in order to set these 
costs against the effectiveness of policies later.  Such work could 
improve policy evaluation and ultimately to improve the value for money 
of public expenditure on agri-environmental schemes.   Administrative 
 7 
activities are vital in bringing policies into existence and running them 
successfully, to achieve their objectives, so given non-zero transactional 
costs, consideration of the organisational resource implications should be 
a core element of policy design. 
 
Work on economic organisation by Williamson (1985) might guide 
thinking with regard to agri-environmental policy design, and provide 
some insights into the relative cost-effectiveness of different approaches 
to policy.  An important hypothesis is that the organisational forms of 
economic systems will differ, because the constraints that arise in the 
production and exchange of a particular commodity vary.  Given the 
varying characteristics of different agri-environmental goods, some 
policy instruments will be more appropriate than others to improve the  
provision of any given good. 
 
Consider existing agri-environmental schemes in England.  Governments 
in many countries (and especially in Western Europe) have tried to 
stimulate agri-environmental goods production through the development 
of ‘administrative’ markets for them.  Compensation payments are made 
by the State in return for commitments from land-owners to manage the 
land in specified ways with the objective of producing environmental 
goods and services.  The state is thus, in effect, a buyer, and landowners 
are sellers.  Such mechanisms work primarily through ‘collectivising’ 
agri-environmental transactions, i.e., by reducing the search costs of 
buyers and sellers, facilitating transactions, and thus allowing 
improvements in the resource allocation to be made.  The question, thus, 
is, if a ‘market’ is to be established for agri-environmental goods, what 
type of market would be best?   
Comment:  
Comment:  
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Rather than considering simply the production of agri-environmental 
goods, the alternative policy structures and their relative appropriateness 
to provide different types of agri-environmental goods can be considered 
from a transactional economics perspective, in terms of the degree of 
information asymmetry between farmers and the State, and the level of 
and farmer opportunism.  As heterogeneity rises, in terms of both the 
producers opportunity costs and the attributes of the output, search and 
information costs rise.  The challenge is to identify the transactional 
system that will allow production costs (or compensation costs, from the 
perspective of the public agency) and organisational costs to be 
minimised.  So, for example, standard payments might be used where 
farms are homogenous in terms of their agricultural opportunity costs 
and their potential environmental outputs, but auctions of entitlements to 
agri-environmental payments might be more appropriate where 
homogenous agri-environmental contracts are being offered to 
heterogeneous farmers (see, for example, Latacz-Lohman & Van der 
Hamsvoort 1998). Targeted payments might be more appropriate where 
heterogeneous farmers are supplying heterogeneous goods.  Table 1 
summarises the existing agri-environmental schemes in England.  
However, note that homogeneity is a matter of degree. 
 
However, before taking the theoretical analysis further, we need more 
information on the actual incidence and magnitudes of administrative 
costs in the agri-environmental policy sphere.  The rest of this paper 
therefore contributes some empirical analysis for the ESA scheme to the 
debate. 
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Table 1: Instrument-Appropriateness And Producer/Production 
Type 
 
  Farmer variability (in terms of agricultural 
opportunity costs) 
 
  homogenous     heterogeneous 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agri-
environmental 
good 
variability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 homogenous 
 
standard contracts and 
payments for specified 
goods and services 
 
e.g., ESA payments, 
differentiated according to 
area, where large groups of 
farmers in the same region 
have relatively similar 
agricultural opportunity costs 
 
auctions  
 
 
e.g., Countryside  
Stewardship 
Scheme payments  
 
e.g., National 
Forest Tender 
Scheme 
  
heterogeneous 
 
site-specific management agreements and 
payments 
   
 
 
 
e.g., SSSI 
management 
agreements and 
individually-
negotiated payment 
levels 
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3. EMPIRICAL TRANSACTIONS COST ANALYSIS FOR AGRI-
ENVIRONMENTAL SCHEMES 
 
The question, how much does agri-environmental governance cost, is an 
empirical one.  There has been considerable attention, in economic 
policy analysis, to the opportunity costs of agri-environmental policy at 
farm-level, in terms of lost production.  However, virtually no analytical 
attention has been given, so far, to the organisational element of policy-
related costs through empirical research.  Scheme-related transactions 
costs have resource use implications in both the public and the private 
sectors, i.e., on both sides of an exchange, through constraining the type, 
and number of exchanges each can make, for example, given a wealth 
constraint of the buyer and a profit-maximising constraint of the seller.  
The main effect is thus to reduce participation in a scheme by private 
agents (as the privately-incurred transactions costs of participation shift 
the supply curve upwards) and to suppress the expressed demand (as 
manifest in the payments made available by the administration, on behalf 
of society more broadly, to farmers and landowners to supply 
environmental goods and services).  As a result, for example, less land is 
entered into the scheme than would be the case if transactions costs were 
lower. 
 
Like production costs, transactions costs cover a heterogeneous 
assortment of inputs, so a starting point is the examination of what 
transactions occur, and which are needed for ‘effective’ policy operation. 
The research focus here was placed on the public sector, given the large 
numbers and diffuseness of scheme participants.  Interest lay in the 
marginal costs (to governments) of a policy change (for example, of 
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extending ESA coverage by an extra hectare), given an existing, well-
functioning broader policy framework.  There is a whole spectrum of 
institutional costs to identify and assess, but to keep the research within 
manageable bounds, the scope of enquiry was narrowed to the direct set-
up and operating costs of schemes.   
 
Voluntary, compensated, multi-annual management agreements with 
private landowners, as in the ESA scheme, form currently the most-
favoured mechanism in agri-environmental policy frameworks in the EU.  
Their numbers have expanded considerably following the 
implementation of Regulation 2078/92.  The mechanism used in such 
schemes is particularly interesting in the transactions-economics context 
as, in effect, it amounts to a ‘quasi-market’ in agri-environmental goods, 
requiring substantial levels of farmer/agency transacting.  Table 2 
summarises the principal components of administrative costs for such 
schemes, at the levels of both the public agency and farmer participants. 
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Table 2: Categories of Transactional Costs Incurred in the 
Implementation of Voluntary Schemes Based on Compensated 
Management Agreements and Cost Incidence 
 
Main 
Category 
Sub-Category State agency costs Participant costs 
  Fixed Variable 
with no. of 
participants 
Fixed Variable, 
e.g., with 
hectares 
entered 
Information - surveying of the 
designated area 
√    
 - designation of area and 
designing management 
prescriptions 
√    
 - re-notification / re-
design of prescriptions 
√    
Contracting - promotion of scheme to 
farmers 
√ √ √  
 - negotiation between 
organisation and farmer 
 √ √ √ 
 - administration of 
contract (making 
payments) 
 √ √ √ 
Policing - environmental 
monitoring and scheme 
evaluation 
√    
 - enforcement of farmer 
compliance 
 √ √ √ 
 
Given the inevitability of policy set-up costs and other on-going 
evaluation and development needs, agri-environmental schemes often 
incur substantial fixed administrative costs at the level of any given 
scheme (such as the core personnel needed to direct and evaluate it), and 
also variable costs at the level of participation within the scheme.  For 
example, each land-owner must be sent an initial information pack on the 
objectives and terms of the scheme, before negotiations over entry can 
start.  Variable costs such as compliance monitoring through farm visits 
also relate to the number of participants, with each one adding to the 
level of overall administrative costs.  Costs will be incurred through 
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several different activities, such as record-keeping; farm mapping; 
conservation plan development; processing scheme application forms; 
processing annual payment claims where compensation is available; and 
farm-visits for compliance monitoring.  A problem, consequently, for the 
efficient administrative management for voluntary schemes lies in the 
difficulties of predicting changes in participation levels (particularly 
through new recruitment each year), which are important drivers of costs, 
despite the existence of substantial fixed components to the running costs 
of schemes. 
 
The relative importance of the main, direct transactional cost 
components borne by the public sector for the schemes currently 
operating in England under Regulation 2078/92 is displayed in Table 3.  
All of these schemes are at different stages of implementation and show 
wide diversity in their direct demands for administrative resources.  The 
variation is, of course, partly related to the nature of individual schemes, 
but reflects mainly the life cycle of scheme development.  As time passes 
following scheme introduction, payments to farmers as a percentage of 
total scheme costs tend to rise, and the proportion related to monitoring 
and running costs falls.  New schemes typically require fixed-cost 
development-type administrative activities in their first year, as the 
details of implementation are finalised and the scheme is set up, rather 
than the transactional activities relating to land-owner participation.  
Transactional activities rise in relative importance once participation 
increases. After the set-up period, payments to participants begin to flow, 
and although monitoring and running costs become quite significant in 
absolute terms, the relative importance of administrative costs dwindles 
rapidly.  However, if the scheme does not attract many farmers, 
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administrative costs may remain relatively important (for example, as 
demonstrated by the Moorlands Scheme and the Conservation, Habitats 
and Access Schemes). The ESA is the major agri-environmental scheme 
in England, in terms of its coverage and expenditure, and is examined in 
more detail below. 
 
Table 3: Percentage of Total Policy Expenditure Accounted for by  
Components for Six Regulation 2078/92 Schemes in England, 1995/6 
 
 Percentage of Overall Policy Expenditure, 1995/6 
 All ESAs NSAs Habitat 
scheme 
Organic 
Aid 
scheme 
Country-
side 
Access 
Moor-
land 
Scheme 
Payments to 
farmers 
71.2 82.6 67.2 55.1 57.4 16.8 0 
Running costs 19.9 12.4 20.5 33.0 27.7 74.8 100.0 
Environmental 
monitoring 
costs 
9.0 5.1 12.3 11.9 14.9 8.4 0 
 
 
Source: House of Commons (1997). NB no data were reported for the Countryside 
Stewardship Scheme. 
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3.1. The English ESA Scheme 
 
The ESA scheme is targeted on those areas of the country which are of 
national environmental importance, and is designed to achieve high 
levels of take-up and widespread environmental gains in such areas.  It is 
complemented by the Countryside Stewardship Scheme (CSS), which is 
available on all types of land outside ESAs, subject to the environmental 
priorities determined each year (in each region) and available funding.  
Since 1996, MAFF has had responsibility for both schemes 4, and hence 
the flexibility to ensure that resources are allocated to each scheme most 
cost-effectively. 
 
The aim, in general, of the ESA scheme, is to maintain and re-create 
environmental or landscape features.  Prescriptions relate to management 
for stone-walls, hedgerows and unimproved grassland, limiting or 
avoiding the use of fertilisers and pesticides, and allowing winter 
flooding to occur.  Management agreements relating to the basic tiers 
require farmers to maintain the land in its present state through 
conversion to traditional farming systems; further intensification is 
strongly discouraged.  Management agreements in the enhancement tiers 
require farmers to revert to more traditional and less intensive methods of 
managing the land, in return for higher payments.  The tier structure, 
management prescriptions and payments are unique to each area.  In 
twelve of the twenty two areas in England, farmers are obliged to enter 
all their land into the scheme, if they wish to participate in it.  In ten 
areas, farmers are obliged to enter only their grassland, or can choose 
                                                 
4
 The Countryside Stewardship Scheme was administered by the Countryside 
Commission in its pilot phase. 
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which parts of their farms to enter, in order to participate.  The scheme is 
focused on agricultural land; other land uses are not eligible for grant 
payments.  Farmers are also obliged to have regard for environmentally-
significant features such as marshes, ponds and woods, though they are 
not generally required to maintain them in a particular way.  They may 
apply for grants towards the cost of such capital works.  However, 
beyond this, there is little provision in the scheme for encouraging 
environmentally-friendly arable farming, in particular: for example, there 
are no tiers to encourage the reduced use of fertilisers and pesticides on 
arable crops 5. 
 
The 1996 review of the first five ESAs concluded that the scheme had 
generally been successful in maintaining the traditional character of the 
landscape and arresting environmental decline, and in particular the 
ploughing up of grasslands had been halted (NAO 1997).  However, it is 
still too soon to see statistically significant evidence of ecological 
restoration and enhancement.  The ESAs also varied considerably in the 
extent to which they had suffered environmental damage before 
designation.  For example, the landscape and ecology of the Pennine 
Dales was considered to be relatively undamaged, containing some of the 
best examples of hay meadows in the country and a largely intact 
characteristic pattern of stone walls (ibid.).  The situation of this area 
contrasts with other areas, especially in the South and East of England, 
which had been more seriously affected by intensification over the last 
fifty years.  For example, in Breckland, most of the traditional habitat 
                                                 
5
 Some areas include tiers to encourage farmers to avoid spraying the margins of 
fields containing cereal crops, but these tiers are costly and bureaucratic to administer 
as the position and length of such margins varies from year to year as crops are rotated 
(NAO 1997). 
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had already been destroyed, and the few surviving areas of lowland heath 
represented only 9% of the total area. 
 
The ESA scheme is the largest agri-environmental scheme administered 
by MAFF in terms of total expenditure. Table 4 shows the absolute levels 
of public expenditure on the ESA scheme over time.  While 
compensation costs have risen each year, with participation increases and 
payment rises, administrative costs have fluctuated around £12m each 
year, rather than rising in line with participation.  A complication is that 
different ESAs have experienced different participation changes at 
different times, given the different years in which they were designated, 
as well as varying levels of popularity of the scheme in the different 
areas.  The ESA scheme was the earliest one based on voluntary, 
compensated management agreements, and since its introduction it has 
been extended substantially, especially in 1992/3 after the 
implementation of Regulation 2078/92 by the UK government and a 
major scheme review by MAFF.  Its recently-recorded administrative 
costs therefore include a full mixture of all administrative activities from 
setting-up costs through to detailed monitoring.  Still, relative to the main 
agricultural schemes that MAFF administers, total expenditure on the 
ESA scheme is relatively small, at only a few per cent of overall 
expenditure in the agricultural sphere in England 6. 
                                                 
6
 For example, in 1995/6, in England, arable area payments amounted to around 
£1,400m, sheep annual premium to £200m, beef special premium to £150m and 
suckler cow to £120m (MAFF/IBAP 1996). 
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Table 4: The Absolute Levels of the Public Costs of ESAs in 
England, 1992/3-1996/7, £m 
 
 1992/3 1993/4 1994/5 1995/6 1996/7 
(estimated) 
Payments to farmers 10.9 16.5 20.1 29.1 32.5 
Administration 11.1 13.9 12.2 13.3 10.1 
Gross Costs 22.0 30.4 32.3 42.4 42.6 
Recovered from EU 2.0 12.7 9.6 13.3 14.2 
Source: NAO (1997). 
 
Between 1987-1991, around 24% of the total reported costs of the first 
round of ESAs in England related to administration (NAO 1997).  In 
1995/6, by which time twenty-two ESAs had been implemented (twelve 
within the past two years), the total administrative costs of ESAs 
(summarised in Table 5), at £13.3m, amounted to 46% of the grants paid 
to farmers.  Costs relate to activities in three main organisations: MAFF 
headquarters (overseeing, evaluating and developing the operation of the 
scheme), the Agricultural Development and Advisory Service (ADAS, 
now the Farm and Rural Conservation Agency (FRCA)) in providing 
assistance for farmer applicants, and carrying out environmental, and in 
the regional offices of MAFF (the Regional Service Centres, RSCs) in 
relation to the administration of applications. 
 
Table 5: Administrative Costs for the English ESAs, 1995/6 
 £m 
ADAS / FRCA management 5.9 
ADAS / FRCA environmental monitoring 3.3 
MAFF RSCs 1.6 
MAFF head-quarters costs 2.5 
Source: NAO (1997). 
 
A substantial proportion of the overall scheme organisational costs relate 
to the use of ADAS/FRCA project officers, which has been argued to be 
 19 
a key element of scheme success.  Project Officers liaise with private 
landowners and set-up management agreements to achieve changes in 
farm management: they visit farms after an application has been received 
by the RSC, advising farmers on which tiers to enter and how to comply.  
Such activities are very important in terms of raising farmer awareness of 
the scheme: project officers produce newsletters and hold one or two 
meetings a year (House of Commons 1997:46). There may well be an 
important role of project officer involvement in reducing private 
information costs (for example, relating to the choice of conservation  
management actions), and thus removing some barriers to scheme 
participation.  
 
RSC management costs relate to scheme administration, processing 
claims, applications, issuing agreement letters, compliance monitoring, 
and dealing with disputes. Applications require significantly greater staff 
resources to process than payment claims (NAO 1997), and as the 
number of each varies significantly between different ESAs, there will be 
different degrees of economies of scale.  The NAO (1997) noted that 
local variations in processing times between RSCs did not appear to be 
explained by differences in the complexity of ESAs and the length of 
time they had been established, suggesting that more idiosyncratic 
factors should be examined, at the level of each RSC. 
 
Provision is also made by MAFF for visits to a fairly high proportion of 
participating farmers each year in ESAs, although in the past the visit 
rate has varied significantly across RSCs.  This requires substantial field 
officer involvement. Each of the nine RSCs has, until recently, been 
required to check 20% of management agreements annually for 
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compliance; a 5% checking level is required under EU Regulation 
746/96) and rates are now falling to come into line with this.  The NAO 
found that the actual rate of compliance checking varied widely, from 
14-42% of participants in any year, with eight out of nine RSCs over-
checking relative to the target of 20% of participants (overall 25.8% were 
monitored in 1995/6).   Furthermore, the NAO (1997) suggested that 
compliance-monitoring tasks could be linked more closely to key 
priorities and environmental risks.  The proportion of agreements 
monitored where non-compliance was suspected has recently increased 
(from 16.7% in 1995 to 18.95% in 1996).  The identification of risky 
management agreements (for example, according to whether the claimant 
is new to the scheme, the size of the claim, the amount of this relating to 
enhancement tiers, any changes in the agreement and the number of years 
since the last check) could lead to potential savings of £100,000 per year 
without reducing the effectiveness of compliance (ibid.). 
 
ADAS devised the environmental monitoring programme for ESAs in 
1987, and has since been responsible for implementing it.  For each ESA, 
land cover, landscape, plant and bird life, and historical and 
archaeological features are covered.  Given that few large-scale 
monitoring projects of this kind had been attempted before, there were 
few comparables for ADAS to draw upon, so it had to pioneer new 
monitoring and analytical techniques (NAO 1997).  The botanical 
monitoring approach in particular requires considerable resources, as 
selected sites are assessed in great detail.  The Countryside Commission 
and English Nature, in contrast, favour more extensive surveys, which 
are much cheaper and enable larger areas to be covered relatively quickly 
(ibid.). 
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3.2. A Conceptual Administrative Cost Model for the ESA Scheme 
 
A conceptual model of factors affecting the magnitude of administrative 
costs for the English ESA scheme is developed below, followed by some 
testing through the econometric estimation of administrative cost 
functions (Section 4).  Some of the factors likely to affect the 
organisational costs of agri-environmental policies such as ESAs are 
summarised in Table 6. It is useful to draw the distinction between fixed 
and variable transactions costs, particularly in terms of set-up, 
contracting and monitoring.  The early years of any scheme would be 
expected to have relatively high costs relating to set-up, as discussed 
earlier in relation to Table 27.  After introduction, other fixed costs 
relating to scheme evaluation and development will remain.   Given the 
existence of substantial fixed (set-up) costs, economies of scale may also 
be important; some transactions costs may be independent of the area 
entered into the scheme, or of the amount transferred. At the aggregate-
level, staffing input was expected to decline after the first two ESA 
designation rounds to reflect the switch from start-up activities to the 
more routine administration of schemes. 
                                                 
7
 Another potentially-important factor relates to re-designation.  The first two rounds 
of ESA designations were reviewed in 1992/3 and consequently some were revised 
and extended (for example, the Pennine Dales ESA increased from 15,960 hectares in 
1987 to 46,000 hectares in 1992) (Whitby 1996). 
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Table 6: Factors Affecting the Level of Administrative Costs For 
ESAs and Other Schemes Based on Voluntary Management 
Agreements 
 
Independent variable Scheme 
set-up 
Contracting Compliance 
monitoring 
and 
enforcement 
Number of participants, both cumulative 
numbers and new entrants in any year 
 ↑ ↑ 
Level of promotional efforts ↑ ↓? ↓? 
Geographical characteristics such as 
remoteness of farmers, ecological 
variability, location within an LFA 
↑ ↑ ↑ 
The area of common land contained 
within the ESA 
 ↑ ↑ 
Area entered into the scheme(total and 
per farm) 
 ↑ ↑ 
Positive farmer attitudes towards 
conservation 
 ↓ ↓ 
Levels of entry into the scheme and 
stringency of requirements 
↑ ↑ ↑ 
Entry requirements such as whole farm 
entry 
 ↑/↓ ↑/↓ 
Participation of farmers in other schemes  ↑/↓ ↑/↓ 
Number of years since scheme's 
introduction 
 ↓ ↓ 
 
Interest lies primarily in the characteristics of individual ESAs, such as 
the size of their eligible areas and the number of eligible farms contained 
within them.  A greater number of land-owners potentially eligible to 
enter the scheme would be expected to entail more administrative work.  
Costs relate both to those landowners who actually participate, and those 
who do not, as costs may still be incurred in relation to the latter through 
answering inquiries and promotional activities by the implementing 
agency.  Trade-offs may exist between different types of scheme-
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organisational expenditures.  For example, greater expenditure on 
scheme promotion and farmer information may allow savings to be made 
on agreement negotiation or enforcement, given improved understanding 
of requirements and objectives, and perhaps improve the level of 
conservation benefits achieved as a result of scheme participation 
(particularly in the longer-term).  Socio-economic studies conducted by 
MAFF in 1996 of farmers participating in ESAs found that continuing 
promotion of the scheme (in addition to the availability of financial 
incentives) was a significant factor influencing farmers not to revert to 
more intensive farming (NAO 1997). 
 
Locational factors should be considered.  For example, the overlap of the 
ESA with a Less Favoured Area (LFA) could increase administrative 
burdens given greater geographical remoteness.  However, at the same 
time, scheme participation may be considered by farmers to be relatively 
favourable, compared to assessment for other areas, given the 
agricultural income situation, with the consequent easier negotiation of 
management agreements and reduced administrative demands.  The 
inclusion of a substantial area of common land in the ESA may increase 
administrative costs through increasing the complexity of negotiating 
management agreements (a consensus of all land-owners holding rights 
over the commons is required for such land to be entered into the 
scheme).   
 
A more complicated scheme, with more management options, is likely to 
raise the costs of negotiating and enforcing agreements.  More stringent 
requirements (higher costs to land-owners in terms of foregone 
production) mean that for any given probability of detection, cheating is 
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more rational, raising enforcement costs. Farmers with more positive 
attitudes towards the scheme and its conservation objectives might be 
expected to be more co-operative, reducing the transactional costs of 
establishing management agreements and the costs of monitoring and 
enforcement.   The broad co-operation of entrants with the agency would 
mean that environmental agencies could rely far more on self-
enforcement, thus reducing enforcement-related transactions costs, 
although this would depend on the visibility of non-compliance and the 
extent of peer pressure.  Farmers with more positive attitudes towards 
conservation schemes (profit-satisfying rather than profit-maximising) 
should be less likely to cheat.  Attitudes may be linked to income levels 
or production type. 
 
Requirements such as whole-farm entry may complicate or simplify the 
negotiation of management agreements.  For example, the whole farm 
area must be entered into the contract in the Lake District ESA; for 
others, such as the Broads, plots of the farm may be entered.   Given that 
some of the costs of entering land into the scheme are fixed (for example, 
relating to making initial enquiries), the basis for entry might be expected 
to affect scheme transactions costs on a per-agreement or per-hectare 
basis.  There may be some positive spillover effects from the 
implementation of other, related policies.  Total transactions costs might 
not increase in a linear way with the number of additional schemes as the 
costs of some activities (such as the initial surveys, ecological 
monitoring through farm visits and so on) can be shared.  Alternatively, 
however, administration costs may be increased through the need to co-
ordinate schemes and prevent overlap, double payments, etc..  Costs 
might be expected to fall with experience for both farmers and the 
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administrating body, and as the types of administrative activities change.  
Idiosyncratic factors such as staff turnover levels or competence levels 
will affect administrative efficiency. 
 
Some general factors expected to affect administrative cost levels might 
be summarised: 
 
• scheme transparency and the ease with which environmental 
management requirements are understood by farmers, without 
needing recourse to expert, professional advice 
• the observability of compliance with the environmental management 
requirements (linked to the nature of the agri-environmental goods to 
be provided) 
• scheme objectives and the degree to which these are pursued (i.e., the 
difference between simply giving farmers compensatory payments, 
which is very easy, and making sure that they actually change their 
management practices to generate environmental benefits). 
• the degree of targeting and site-specific negotiations (given the likely 
trade-offs between compensation and organisational costs) 
• the regularity of agency - participant interactions, for example, 
compliance monitoring targets 
• the potential  for economies of scale, given substantial fixed costs of 
scheme set-up 
• the time since scheme implementation, linked both to the activities 
required for scheme administration and the likelihood of fine-tuning 
and efficiency improvements from the experience gained by the 
implementing agency in the earlier stages  
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• the technology available for monitoring and administration (e.g. 
geographic information systems linked to databases to avoid any 
duplication of payments under different but related schemes) 
• farmer attitudes and understanding (affecting the level of monitoring 
and enforcement activities needed) 
 
3.3. Empirical Models of the Administrative Costs of ESAs 
 
The aim of the econometric work was to estimate administrative cost 
functions for the English ESAs based on the empirical data available, to 
test some of the hypothesised relationships between costs and scheme 
structure and participation in Table 5.  However, no data were available 
on some important variables such as staff competencies, the number of 
enquiries that failed to result in a signed management agreement and the 
geographical diffusion of participating or interested farmers and their 
attitudes to conservation.   In addition, it was impossible to include data 
on the levels of entry into different tiers of the scheme (and particularly, 
the relative popularity of basic versus enhancement tiers)8.  The costs of 
negotiating and enforcing agreements, on a per-agreement or per-hectare 
basis, would be expected to be higher where more land is entered into 
higher tiers (although the ratios of administrative costs to compensatory 
payments may not change much as compensation would rise too) 9. 
 
                                                 
8
 However, information for each ESA on the number of hectares entered into each 
Tier for two of the five years, 1994/5 and 1995/6, indicated the dominance of basic-
level participation in the scheme. 
9
 It is important to remember, though, that entry into higher tiers is constrained by the 
area eligible for such entry, which may be a fairly small proportion of the area eligible 
for basic-tier entry. 
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A hurdle for empirical analysis was that the administrative costs incurred 
in direct relation to the ESA scheme, for tasks such as policy set-up, 
monitoring and enforcement are generally not precisely costed10.  Ideally, 
the direct costs for any scheme need to be assessed along with the 
indirect costs (such as a proportion of the central government overhead 
costs).  There are a number of challenges in measuring organisational 
costs, for example, the separability of administrative functions at the 
level of any particular agency is often limited; government agencies carry 
out many different activities, with a consequent difficulty in apportioning 
costs to any specific one of these.  Consequently, most reported 
administrative costs are at very high levels of aggregation.   In addition, 
the incidence of scheme administrative costs begins before farmers sign 
contracts, and continues beyond the end of their participation. 
 
There are at least two parties to every scheme-related transaction, i.e., the 
land-holder and the state agency; most attention is focused on the latter 
in this paper, although farm- and farmer-specific factors are expected to 
be very important and as such are identified as a key area for future 
work.  Access to individual files on participating farms was not possible, 
nor was obtaining information directly from farms through a survey, 
given resource constraints.  Instead, aggregate administrative cost data 
was obtained from MAFF officials, disaggregated across the twenty-two 
English ESAs, for the years 1992/3 to 1996/7.  Costs were given as three 
main components: management costs (ADAS / FRCA and RSCs), 
monitoring costs (ADAS/FRCA environmental and socio-economic 
surveys), and other over-head costs relating to the MAFF Conservation 
                                                 
10
 In addition, policy advisory bodies (such as the National Farmers’ Union) incur 
costs too, especially in the policy set-up phase. 
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Management Division and the Economics Unit (including, for example,  
the costs of carrying out socio-economic surveys as part of the evaluation 
strategy).   
 
The headquarters data were of two types: overhead (fixed) staff costs 
which were allocated equally over all the ESAs, and costs relating to 
policy development in the economics unit which were allocated on the 
basis of the specific tasks undertaken in each ESA. 
 
The functions of the RSCs and ADAS/FRCA are closely linked and both 
are involved in interactions with farmers.  The cost estimations were 
slightly problematic as both bodies are involved in non-ESA work, 
requiring some apportionment to be carried out based on estimates of the 
time spent on ESA-related work.  ADAS/FRCA management costs were 
based on actual recorded time, from 1992/3, specified for different 
activities relating to each ESA.  RSC management costs were allocated 
from 1993/4 on the basis of actual time-recording for each activity type.  
Formal time recording procedures were not in place in 1992/3, and since 
some RSCs managed more than one ESA, time breakdowns across ESAs 
were based on data relating to the breakdown of work in ADAS/FRCA.  
Staff hours per ESA in each year were then multiplied by a notional staff 
cost, based on the overall MAFF payment for ESA management to each 
RSC and ADAS branch, divided by the total staff in each branch.  This 
staff cost varied with time, according to chances in the budget allocated 
to each unit.  Staff costs included travel and subsistence, but no 
allowance was made for accommodation and other overheads (de Bolla, 
MAFF, pers.comm. 1999). 
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The ESA-level administrative-cost data provided by MAFF were 
disaggregated from data recorded at the level of regional offices; hence, 
analysis at the RSC level may throw more light on the issue of scheme 
administrative cost levels and their variability compared to analysis at the 
ESA-level.  Nine RSCs administer the twenty-two ESAs, as shown in 
Table 7.  The NAO (1997) analysed the time taken by RSCs to process 
applications and claims, and found this to be very variable, with little, if 
any, correlation between the time taken by ADAS/FRCA regional offices 
and the RSCs.  The differences did not appear to be explained by 
differences in ESA complexity and the length of time of establishment.   
There has been little formal comparative analysis, to date, of the relative 
efficiency of the MAFF RSCs or ADAS/FRCA regional offices in 
administering ESAs.  Annual management reports give budgets and staff 
resources, but without relating them to workloads; performance 
indicators are needed. However, different RSCs may deal with ESAs of 
different complexity; differences between ESA requirements, such as 
whether parts of the farm, rather than the whole farm, can be entered 
should be considered too. 
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Table 7: ESA and RSC Links 
 
RSCs ESAs Year of 
Designation 
No. 
of 
ESAs 
No. of 
ESAs 
in an 
LFA 
Total 
designated 
hectares 
Northallerton Pennine Dales 1987 1 1 55,769 
Reading South Downs 
Test Valley 
North Kent Marshes 
Avon Valley 
Upper Thames 
Tributaries 
1987 
1988 
1993 
1994 
1994 
5 0 119,922 
Bristol Somerset Levels & 
Moors  
South Wessex 
Downs 
Exmoor 
1987 
1993 
1993 
3 1 154,752 
Cambridge Broads 
Breckland 
Suffolk River 
Valleys 
Essex Coast 
1987 
1988 
1988 
1994 
4 2 219,585 
Exeter West Penwith 
Dartmoor 
Blackdown Hills 
1987 
1994 
1994 
3 3 149,078 
Crewe Clun 
South West Peak  
Shropshire Hills 
1988 
1993 
1994 
3 2 93,741 
Nottingham North Peak 1988 1 1 54,885 
Carlisle Lake District 1993 1 1 245,382 
Worcester Cotswold Hills 1994 1 0 85,739 
Source: MAFF, unpublished data. 
 
As an example, the NAO (1997) found that the average staff time 
required for each agreement actually concluded ranged, across all of the 
English ESAs, from eight hours in Somerset to 39 hours in the Essex 
Coast ESA.  Some differences probably relate to questions of geography, 
particularly differences in travel time for officers who have to go out and 
examine farms (for example, the land eligible to enter the Essex Coast 
ESA is quite spread out geographically) (Packer, evidence to the Public 
 31 
Accounts Committee, 1998).  The newness of any specific scheme is also 
a factor, linked to farmer attitudes; scheme acceptability may well 
increase with time as farmers gain understanding and experience of it, 
with implications for the promotional activities needed over time.  There 
may also be behavioural differences and differences in the strength of the 
available financial incentives related to the predominant type of 
agriculture in the designated area and its income levels.  For example, in 
Somerset, there is a general consensus that the scheme is favourable, but 
there is much less consensus in Essex (ibid.).   Consensus or lack of it 
may impact on the costs of persuading farmers to participate and 
reaching agreement on contracts.  Differences such as the requirement 
for agreement-holders in some ESAs to commit the whole farm to the 
scheme, or the extent of common land, are also likely to affect agreement 
processing time through increasing the complexity of negotiations.  
Finally, there may be intrinsic differences between RSCs, related to 
staffing levels and competencies. It is important to beware of ‘noise’, for 
example, at the RSC level, related to staff turnover, or sick leave and a 
sudden loss of expertise. 
 
A number of caveats to the use of the administrative cost data must be 
borne in mind.  MAFF adopted fairly rudimentary methods to attribute 
some overhead costs to each ESA, since this has not so far been 
necessary for financial management purposes.  The reported costs do not 
include the costs of support services, accommodation  and so on, and 
were spread equally across all ESAs.  The relative crudeness of the data 
must be stressed; in particular, some of the ESA-level data were 
disaggregated from higher-level estimates and to that extent are of 
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spurious precision.  Thus, caution with highly rigorous statistical 
analysis is needed, given the quality of the data 11.   
 
Furthermore, links between explanatory variables should be considered 
and acknowledged where they exist, with the exercise of caution 
subsequently in interpreting results.  For example, the numbers of 
hectares entered under the scheme and the number of agreements made 
would be expected to correlate reasonably well, if farmers of similar 
sizes tend to enter a similar proportion of their land into the scheme.  The 
numbers of both new and existing agreements are likely to be a function 
of the number of years over which the ESA has been in existence, as well 
as factors such as the degree of promotional efforts by project officers, 
and the level of compensatory payments relative to foregone incomes. 
Generally, the number of new agreements falls as time elapses following 
designation, and the cumulative number of agreements of course rises. A 
limitation to the data is that only information on the net change in 
numbers of agreements and hectares is known, rather than the break-
down of how many agreements ceased to exist and how many new 
agreements were established in any particular year.  Monitoring and 
enforcement efforts may also be linked to promotional efforts where the 
latter impact on farmers’ understanding of what is required of them to 
fulfil the agreement conditions 12. 
 
                                                 
11
 For example, the usual battery of tests for heteroskedasticity, auto-correlation and 
multi-collinearity  have not been performed, on the grounds that these would work at 
a level that cannot be justified given the quality of the data. 
12
 Land Use Consultants (1995), in their evaluation of the Countryside Stewardship 
scheme, found that in some cases non-compliance was due to inadequate 
understanding and conservation skills development by farmers in the scheme. 
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Several different administrative cost models were investigated using the 
MAFF data-set, with total administrative costs, costs per hectare entered 
into the scheme, average costs per agreement under the scheme and the 
ration of administration cost: compensation as dependent variables.   
Administrative costs were normalised for some measure of their output 
using data on the payments made to farmers, to give some notion of what 
might be being achieved in terms of agri-environmental policy 
objectives.  However, this approach is only valid to the extent that there 
is a link between foregone agricultural income and environmental 
benefits (or absence of dis-benefits). Taking the ratio of administrative 
costs to compensation paid to reflect  a measure of scheme success (as 
characterised by the transfer of money to farmers) is a very crude 
simplification, but it might be considered useful given that there no 
other, general measures of scheme output are available at present for all 
22 ESAs.   There is no certainty that such a relationship exists, or if it 
does, that it is linear; furthermore, the lags in the appearance of 
conservation benefits give rise to problems when trying to link them to 
administrative activities. 
 
Careful interpretation of the figures is essential.  For example, scheme 
payments per hectare tend to be lower in LFAs, as the private 
opportunity costs of agricultural production are generally lower in these 
areas than in lowland regions.  However, it may well be that the costs of 
setting up and servicing management agreements are to some degree 
fixed, regardless of which ESA is under analysis (similar procedures 
must be followed across all ESAs).  Thus, a relatively high ratio of 
administration to compensatory costs would be expected, although this is 
not necessarily indicative of low efficiency.  The analysis is tightly 
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constrained in this respect, in that we do not really know yet the value of 
the environmental improvements secured through management 
agreements, and how these vary across time and space 13. 
 
It is also important to remember that agreements may be terminated after 
the first five years, although the intention of MAFF is for contracts to run 
for ten years.   The Stage I and II ESAs ran only for five years initially, 
but agreements since 1992 have all been made for ten years. The  
majority of Stage I and II ESA participants applied to join the relaunched 
schemes.  All the first and second round ESAs were evaluated at the end 
of their first five years, so a sudden increase in administration costs 
might be expected at this stage. At the five year review point, MAFF 
carried out a major policy review, and relaunched the schemes, often 
extended with new options (Harrison, MAFF, pers.comm.) 14; the Stage 
III and IV ESAs may or may not experience a similar ‘blip’ in their 
administrative cost time-profiles. 
 
Administrative costs were also investigated through econometric 
modelling at the level of the RSC.  Costs for any RSC, in any one year, 
should be a function of those factors discussed above, in addition to 
factors such as the number of ESAs administered by the RSC and their 
                                                 
13
 NB Published ESA monitoring reports are now starting to be available from MAFF; 
these report on the schemes’ environmental achievements, at the level of each 
individual area. 
14
 For example, in May 1993, options were introduced for providing access with 
enhanced payments for farmers with at least five years still to run, on arable land with 
no existing rights of way.  However, it was not really possible to include such changes 
in the model.  The introduction of a paid access option  is not thought to have had a 
significant impact on running costs, but there are a substantial number of other 
changes that will have had some effect (Harrison, MAFF, pers.comm.). 
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complexity, and the number of ESAs introduced in any year (requiring 
extra set-up and promotional activity).  
 
The econometric analysis presented below was based on the estimation 
of linear multiple regression functions.  However, a linear form is not 
necessarily appropriate so other functional forms were explored. For 
example, administration costs may have a non-linear relation to the 
number of agreements made under the scheme.  One question, for 
example, is whether there might exist administrative economies of scale, 
linked to the numbers of agreements made under the scheme for a 
particular ESA or RSC.  Such economies would be expected given 
substantial fixed costs. Log-linear regression functions might be 
appropriate to capture relationships involving economies of scale, where 
these are present.  Similarly, indicators such as the ratio of administrative 
costs to compensation payments may also have a non-linear relationship 
with time.  Average administration costs per agreement may have a non-
linear relationship with the amount of common land in an ESA; as the 
area of common land (as a proxy, implicitly, for the number of potential 
participants) increases, agreement negotiation may become more and 
more costly.  However, average costs may not fall as the number of 
agreements made rises if there is an upwards-sloping supply curve of 
conservation goods.  Compensation is based on estimated average 
foregone incomes; some low-cost participating farmers will thus acquire 
rents, while others will find that their costs (of lost agricultural 
production) are not fully covered (NAO 1997).  Low-cost, 
straightforward agreements would be made first, with later agreements 
becoming steadily more complex or harder to negotiate.  Thus there are 
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two countervailing forces at work.  A range of different regressions were 
therefore fitted to the data and compared. 
 
3.4. Limitations to the Analysis 
 
An inherent limitation to this analysis is that administrative expenditures 
do not necessarily reflect the quantity and quality of administrative 
activity, either in terms of that administration actually carried out or in 
terms of that effort thought to be required for efficient running of the 
scheme.  Expenditure will depend to a large degree on how well RSCs  
(and MAFF head-quarters) forecast farmer participation and 
administrative resource needs relative to the likely workload in each 
year.   Prediction and budgeting are never perfect.  For example, in 1995, 
expenditure forecasts had to be drastically revised (Hansard, 6th 
February 1996).  Unfortunately, there is little available information on 
how satisfactory staffing levels and competencies are, despite the impact 
of these on the overall efficacy and efficiency of scheme organisation 
(see NAO 1997)15.  Changes in staffing should be dynamic, reflecting the 
changes with time in administrative workloads following ESA 
implementation. 
 
Thus, caution should be exercised when interpreting administrative cost 
data of the type presented here.  Critically, the public budget setting 
process and constraints upon this means that administrative inputs are 
unlikely to be optimal at any given time.  Inflexibility in administrative 
structures must be considered, such as the fact that commonly staffing 
                                                 
15
 See for example, Land Use Consultants (1995) with regard to the Countryside 
Stewardship Scheme. 
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adjustments are only on a yearly basis.  Furthermore, the varying calibres 
of staff inputs must be taken into account, when evaluating 
administrative performance; quality differences are not necessarily 
reflected in wage costs since these are influenced by wider economic 
forces. 
 
Finally, the absence of information on the private transactions costs of 
agri-environmental schemes must be noted.  However, a reasonable 
assumption is that such costs will be covered by compensatory payments, 
as they must be where farmers are not altruistic.  Thus, the methodology 
used in this analysis results in a downwards bias (to a currently unknown 
extent) in per-hectare and per-agreement figures for administrative costs.  
The figures used here to represent transactions costs are incomplete as 
they represent only those costs recorded by the public agency.  
Administrative cost indicators based on the ratio of administrative costs 
to compensation costs are doubly biased, as the denominator is likely to 
include some element of the organisational costs incurred by farmers. 
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4. RESULTS 
 
4.1. ESA-Level Analysis 
 
The relationships between the dependent and the independent variables 
at the level of the individual ESA are summarised below, using simple 
multiple regression models with no interaction effects.  Panel data for 
five years (1992/3-1996/7) were used (110 observations). Table 9 gives 
r-squared values (as an indication of the goodness of fit of any given 
model).  All the functions estimated had statistically significant r-squared 
values (α = 0.05).  Table 10 shows the regression coefficients significant 
at the 95% and 90% confidence levels for the four functions. 
 
Table  9: R-Squared Values for the ESA-Level Linear Regressions 
Dependent Variables r squared f df n 
total administration costs per ESA 0.596 30.68 104 110 
administration costs per hectare 0.278 4.616 84 110 
administrative costs per agreement 0.327 5.749 83 110 
administrative costs as a ratio to compensatory 
costs 
0.251 4.75 85 110 
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Table 10: Coefficients for Independent Variables Found to be 
Significant at the 95% and 90% Confidence Levels for the ESA-
Level Administrative Cost Functions 
 
£ Total  
existing 
agree-
ments in 
any year 
No. of 
new 
agree-
ments in 
any year 
Area of 
common 
land in 
the ESA 
Total 
eligible 
area of 
the ESA 
ESA 
located 
in a 
LFA 
Years 
since 
design
-ation 
Whole 
farm 
entry 
Annual 
admin. costs  
per ESA 
495.7 2020.5  2.9 137,293 - - 
        
Average 
annual 
admin. costs 
per hectare 
entered into 
the scheme 
-0.1 *  0 -0.0   -48.1* 
        
Average 
annual 
admin. costs 
per 
agreement 
made 
-4.2    1,126.7* -186.9 
*
 
 
        
ESA admin. 
costs as a 
proportion of 
compensation 
paid in each 
year 
-0.1 0.5* -0.0    - 
*
 significant at the 90% confidence level. - : not included as an explanatory variable in 
the model. 
 
Each existing agreement under the scheme appears to increase total 
annual ESA-level administration costs by around £497; each net new 
agreement made appears to increase these costs by around £2,020.  There 
are substantial differences between the costs of setting-up and of 
maintaining management agreements; far more intense project-officer 
input is required during the agreement set-up phase than during the 
implementation of the agreement, with important implications for the 
time profile of the administrative costs of ESAs.  The total administrative 
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cost regression suggested that the marginal cost of extending the ESA 
scheme in terms of land coverage is around £2.9 per hectare.  Location 
within an LFA also appears to be important, raising overall ESA 
administration costs by around £137,000.  The particular RSC 
administering the ESA appears unimportant; none of the RSC dummy 
variables were found to be significant explanatory variables so the results 
of estimations including them are not presented here. 
 
The area eligible for ESA entry had a significant but very slight negative 
effect on average annual per-hectare administrative costs, suggesting the 
possibility of economies of scale related to ESA coverage.  The area of 
common land had a significant but very slight positive effect on costs, as 
might be expected if common-land requires more costly negotiation to 
bring it into the scheme.  The requirement of whole-farm entry into the 
scheme was found to reduce average annual per-hectare costs by around 
£48/hectare; this may be linked to economies of scale (some costs of 
entry are fixed, regardless of the area of the farm entered).  It also 
removes another issue from negotiation.  Another potential explanation 
is if ESAs requiring whole-farm entry tend to be located in areas where 
participation in the scheme is generally favourable, given the relatively 
low opportunity costs of agricultural production; agreement negotiation 
may then be more straightforward and so less costly. 
 
The number of agreements in existence in any one year appeared to have 
a negative effect on the average annual administrative costs per 
agreement under the scheme.  This relationship may well be explained by 
the fact that agreements cost far less to maintain than they do to 
establish.  The number of years since ESA designation had a negative 
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effect on average costs (although at a lower significance level), with 
average annual costs per agreement falling by around £190 per year.  
Again, this may reflect the switch in the administrative activities required 
from costly agreement set-up to less costly agreement maintenance.   At a 
similar level of significance, there appeared to be a positive effect (of 
around an extra £1,100 per agreement) of location within an LFA on 
administrative costs. 
 
Finally, with regard to the ratio of administration costs to compensation 
payments in any year (i.e. the costs of transferring £1 of compensation to 
farmers), the number of existing ESA agreements appeared to have a 
negative effect, while new agreements had a small positive effect (again, 
related to the lower costs of maintenance compared to set-up).  There 
also appeared to be a significant but very slight negative effect of 
common-land.  This observation is harder to explain and might relate not 
to the common-land per se but to the correlation of this variable with 
other factors such as the level of foregone agricultural income, the 
favourable nature of entry into the ESA and the consequently lower costs 
of negotiating such entry with farmers. 
 
4.2. RSC-Level Analysis 
 
The relationships between the dependent and the independent variables 
at the level of the individual RSC are summarised below, using simple 
linear multiple regression models with no interaction effects.  Panel data 
for five years (1992/3-1996/7) were used (45 observations). Table 11 
gives r-squared values.  All the functions estimated had statistically 
significant r-squared values (α = 0.05).  Table 12 gives the regression 
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coefficients significant at the 95% and 90% confidence levels for the 
regression models estimated. 
 
Table 11: R-Squared Values for RSC-Level Linear Regression 
Functions 
 
 r squared F df n 
total administration costs 0.536 6.115 37 45 
administration costs per hectare 0.404 2.799 33 45 
administration costs per agreement 0.639 7.296 33 45 
administration as a ratio of compensatory costs 0.407 2.830 33 45 
 
Table 12: Coefficients for Independent Variables Found to be 
Significant at the 95% and 90% Confidence Levels for the RSC-
Level Cost Functions (t values in parenthesis) 
 
£ Total 
existing 
agree-
ments in 
ESAs 
each year 
New 
agree-
ments 
each 
year 
Averag
e years 
the 
ESAs 
had 
been 
running 
Total 
eligible 
ESA 
area 
Area of 
commo
n land 
No. of 
ESAs in 
LFAs 
No. of 
ESAs per 
RSC 
No. of 
new 
ESAs 
in any 
year 
Total 
annual 
admin. 
costs per 
RSC 
 1,496.
9 
(2.64) 
-    112,941.1* 
(1.83) 
 
         
Average 
annual 
admin. 
costs per 
hectare 
  -9.3*
 
(-1.72) 
    12.6 
(2.07) 
         
Average 
annual 
admin. 
costs per 
agreement 
-5.2 
(-5.27) 
-5.1 
(-2.48) 
 0.0 
(2.29) 
-0.1 
(-2.35) 
   
         
Admin. 
costs as a 
% of 
payments 
made in 
each year 
  -1.0 
(-3.04) 
  -1.2 
(-2.02) 
-0.7 
(-1.81) 
 
*
 significant at the 90% confidence level. - : not included as an explanatory variable in the model. 
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The number of new agreements made for ESAs within each RSC’s 
administration was a statistically significant explanatory variable, 
implying that each new agreement costs an extra £1,497 each year in 
administration.  The number of ESAs administered by an RSC also 
appeared to be important in explaining total annual costs, with each extra 
ESA adding a further £112,941 to costs. 
 
The number of new agreements had a statistically-significant but slight 
negative impact on the average annual administrative costs per hectare 
entered into the ESA scheme; this may indicate the existence of some 
economies of scale.  The average number of years since designation for 
the ESAs administered appear to reduce average annual per-hectare costs 
by around £9 per hectare.  This characteristic may be explained by the 
shift in administrative activities from agreement negotiation to more 
routine agreement maintenance; however, there may also be a ‘pure’ 
time-related cost-reduction factor, perhaps if the experience gained from 
running ESAs permits economies to be made in future years through 
fine-tuning administrative procedures.  It is notable that the cumulative 
number of agreements was not a significant explanatory variable, and the 
number of new agreements made had only a very slight effect, adding 
weight to the experience-related (learning curve) hypothesis.  The 
number of ESAs covered by the RSC had a positive effect on average 
annual per-hectare costs, with each additional ESA adding an extra £13 
per hectare.  An explanation may be the costs of co-ordinating different 
schemes, although it was initially expected that extra ESAs would have a 
small negative effect on total RSC costs as fixed administrative costs 
would be spread over a larger base.  Other factors may therefore be at 
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work too, perhaps related to mix of types of ESAs (within and without  
LFAs). 
 
The number of existing management agreements had a negative effect on 
the average annual administrative costs per agreement under the ESA 
scheme, reducing costs by £5 per agreement.  As noted above, this 
negative marginal effect may be due to the difference between the 
administrative  costs of establishing and maintaining agreements, and the 
fixed-cost element of administration to be covered.  The area eligible for 
ESA entry had a very small but positive coefficient, surprisingly.  This 
variable may be a proxy for aspects of ESAs such as dispersal: the more 
diffuse farms are, the further project officers must travel and the higher 
will be the administrative burden.  The area of common-land had a small 
but negative effect, again, opposite to the direction of effect anticipated.  
The negative coefficient may be linked to ESA location within an area of 
low agricultural incomes, and thus relative favourability of ESA 
participation; hence participants may be more enthusiastic, driving down 
negotiation and other administrative costs. 
 
Finally, with regard to the ratio of administrative costs to compensation 
payments in any year across the ESAs administered by each RSC, the 
average number of years the ESAs of each RSC had been running was 
found to have a negative impact.  This effect quite possibly relates to the 
changing administrative workload and the gain in experience allowing 
economies to be made.  The importance of the latter, unquantifiable, 
factor seems particularly plausible given that neither the cumulative  
number of agreements nor the number of new agreements were 
statistically-significant explanatory variables.  A ‘learning factor’ may 
 45 
well be at work, although more investigation of this is needed, for 
example, in the context of information on changes in staffing levels and 
quality over the years of ESA administration in the light of previous 
years’ experience.  The number of ESAs located within LFAs had a 
negative coefficient, i.e., fewer administrative resources are needed to 
transfer each pound of compensation than outside LFAs: it may be that it 
is easier to negotiate agreements within LFAs, where generally ESA 
payments compare well with foregone agricultural incomes.  In addition, 
there is a long tradition of direct payments in ESAs; the familiarity of the 
mechanism may help to keep some costs down.  It may also be the case 
that more agreements are signed within than without LFAs, giving rise to 
some economies of scale.   The number of ESAs administered by each 
RSC was found to have a negative coefficient; this source of cost-
reduction per ESA may be related to economies of scale (spreading fixed 
costs over a broader base). 
 
4.3. Non-Linear ESA-Level Analysis: Examining Scattergrams 
 
Visual examination of scattergrams of administrative-cost and 
participation-related variables can give some guidance with regard to the 
choice of functional form in the econometric analysis.  Table 13 
summarises the observations from these scattergrams and their 
implications for choice of functional form. These observations suggest 
that the econometric analysis could be improved through fitting non-
linear functional forms, such as log-linear functions, to the data.  This is 
an area for further work. 
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Table 13: Summary of Observations from Scattergrams for ESA-
Level Data 
 
Dependent variable Explanatory Variable Notes on functional form 
 
1. administration as a 
proportion of 
compensation payments 
years since designation non-linear fall in the ratio 
with time (reciprocal 
function) with a small rise 
after five years (review stage, 
when, for example, some 
agreements are terminated) 
before continuing to fall 
 
2. participation 
(cumulative number of 
agreements) 
years since designation approximately linear increase 
with time (slightly 
sigmoidal) 
 
3. net change in 
participation (net 
change in agreements 
each year for each 
ESA)  
years since designation non-linear fall with time 
(approximately reciprocal), 
with a sudden small decrease 
after five years 
 
 
4. average annual  
administrative costs per 
hectare 
eligible area of ESA non-linear (reciprocal) fall in 
costs with area (suggesting 
economies of scale) 
 
5. average annual 
administrative costs per 
hectare 
 
area of common land in 
the ESA 
non-linear (reciprocal) fall in 
costs with area 
 
6. total annual 
administrative costs per 
ESA 
participation 
(cumulative number of 
agreements) 
non-linear (reciprocal 
function) rise in total costs 
with participation, suggesting 
economies of scale 
 
7. total annual 
administrative costs per 
ESA 
changes in participation 
in each year (net 
change in the number 
of agreements) 
non-linear rise in 
costs(slightly sigmoidal, 
implying a polynomial 
function)  
 
 
8. average annual 
administrative costs per 
agreement 
ESA participation 
(cumulative number of 
agreements) 
non-linear fall in costs with 
participation, suggesting 
economies of scale 
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4.4. Disaggregating the Administrative Costs of ESAs 
 
The available data were disaggregated into four main categories: ADAS 
management, RSC management, ADAS monitoring (environmental 
appraisals) and overheads (head-quarters costs of policy development 
and so on).    The relationships of the magnitudes of expenditures in each 
of these categories to total expenditure were investigated, to give more 
insights into the changes in administrative functions over time.  The 
relative importance of categories was observed to be highly variable 
across ESAs, even when related to the number of years since ESA 
designation.  Both ADAS and RSC management expenditures rose 
initially relative to total administrative expenditures, before starting to 
fall after the five-year mark.  The relative importance of overheads fell 
slightly, as would be expected following growth in the participation rate 
with time.  A closer look at ADAS and RSC management costs showed a 
non-linear relationship between their relative importance to overall 
administrative costs and participation, again suggesting that there may be 
some participation-related economies of scale in the administrative costs 
related to land-holder entry into the scheme. 
 
A methodological problem lies in trying to untangle, empirically, fixed 
and variable costs and their time incidences.  The overall average annual 
costs are presented here.   However, as time passes, the fixed-cost 
component will generally fall, leaving the variable costs (such as farm 
visits to assess scheme compliance) to dominate.  A methodological 
improvement might involve the calculation of annuitised fixed costs per 
annum to smooth out the fluctuations due to differing time incidence of 
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activities such as scheme monitoring and evaluation, or simply to 
exclude the capital element and explain only variable costs. 
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5. DISCUSSION 
 
5.1. Factors Affecting Administrative Cost Levels 
 
What are the implications for agri-environmental policy development of 
this analysis of administrative resource use across ESAs and RSCs?  The 
implementation of agri-environmental schemes demands substantial 
resources, so it is important to understand the related costs, and the 
variation in costs across different areas, times and implementing 
agencies.  A number of explanatory factors for the observed variations in 
the administration of the English ESAs have been identified here.   
 
One particular observation is that it appears to be far more expensive to 
establish agreements than to maintain them.  The set-up costs should be 
considered as an investment, and the life-span of the ‘asset’ (the natural 
capital protected and maintained or enhanced, and perhaps information 
relating to conservation activities) should be considered in relation to 
these costs.   For example, although the intention under the ESA scheme 
is for management agreements to run for ten years, it is possible to 
terminate them after the first five years.  MAFF reported that a small 
number of agreements have indeed been terminated at the end of the 
contract period in the older ESAs (causing net changes in participation to 
be negative in some years) (House of Commons 1997).  Agreements 
should be maintained for a period long enough to gain real benefits from 
the costs of setting them up. 
 
The econometric analysis suggested that the incremental and cumulative 
numbers of agreements are important determinants of costs, as was 
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expected given the link of some components of costs to participation 
levels and changes in these, and the fact that management agreements 
require two-way interactions between landholders and the administering 
agency.   The results imply some scope for economies of scale related to 
scheme participation; as the numbers of agreements made under the 
scheme in any ESA rise, average costs fall, allowing fixed costs to be 
spread over a broader base.  However, the data was inadequate to allow 
any determination of the true existence of such economies as distinct 
from a fall in average costs per agreement resulting from increasing 
dominance of existing (lower-cost) agreements over new (higher-cost) 
agreements. 
 
Over time, fewer agreements are generally made (total entry levels are of 
course finite).  It is very likely that negotiations become increasingly 
complex, as the more ‘straightforward’ agreements (i.e., ones with lower 
agricultural opportunity costs or ones with lower transactions costs) 
would be expected to have been made much earlier.  Thus, we might 
expect the marginal administrative costs of new scheme participants to 
rise over time, opposing the cost-reducing impact of any economies of 
scale.  Furthermore, there should be a switch in activities from promoting 
the scheme, encouraging applications, negotiating entry and establishing 
contracts to more routine administrative activities related to processing 
payments each year, checking a sample of agreement holders for 
compliance, and carrying out environmental evaluation16.  The 
importance of a shift in activity from establishing agreements to 
maintaining existing agreements (processing payments each year and 
                                                 
16
 The costs of this overhead activity are borne primarily at the national level rather 
than at the regional or ESA level. 
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monitoring a proportion for compliance with management prescriptions) 
has already been noted. 
 
Time is important to the size of ESA administrative costs, in both 
absolute and relative terms.  Generally, administrative costs decline 
relative to the overall costs of the scheme; there are two main reasons for 
this. One reason is that generally the rate of change in participation 
becomes negative over time, and costs fall as fewer new agreements need 
to be established.  Set-up activities are replaced by lower-cost agreement 
maintenance activities (at least up to the year of agreement termination or 
re-negotiation and renewal).  Secondly, compensatory payments rise with 
cumulative participation, dwarfing administration.   
 
There may also be a third, ‘experience’ factor, related to the 
administrative learning curve and economies made over time from fine-
tuning procedures.  However, it is impossible at present, with only the 
data-set used here, to untangle the contribution made by both fine-tuning 
from reflections on past experience  and changes in administrative 
functions as the scheme develops and participation rises.  Furthermore, 
although there might be some scope for economies following from 
previous experience of negotiating management agreements, cost 
reductions may be small.  The site-specificity of individual farms and the 
choice faced by farmers of different sets of prescriptions mean that blue-
prints for the set-up and monitoring of agreements can only go so far 17.  
Still, the experience of the older ESAs may provide lessons for the newer 
                                                 
17
 NB: although agreements follow similar procedures, there will always be a degree 
of participant- and site-specificity. 
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ones, particularly as they come up to the five-year review and opt-out 
stage 18. 
 
5.2. What Scope Exists to Reduce the Administrative Costs of Agri-
Environmental Schemes? 
 
The question is how agri-environmental policies can be designed to 
minimise public administration and private transactions costs, in relation 
to delivery of benefits, i.e., with regard to the optimal allocation of public 
resources to schemes and the division of expenditure between 
administrative costs and participant compensation payments.  Given 
allocations of funds and transaction technology, is it possible to improve 
upon the status quo?  Administrative resource use does not necessarily 
imply inefficiency, even when incurred at high levels (in absolute or in 
relative terms).  The importance of (at least) some administrative 
activities to scheme success has been emphasised here: it is crucial to 
keep such costs in perspective, while assessing whether available 
funding is being utilised effectively, with the optimal mix of activities. 
 
Improvements are being made to the present ESA scheme, especially 
following  the  NAO  (1997)  enquiry.  In 1995/6, £13.3m  was  spent  on 
ESA  administration,  i.e.,  43%  of  the  amounts  paid  to  farmers  as  
compensation.  This figure stood at 35% in 1996/7, with 27% forecast for 
1997/8 and 23% expected for 1998/9 (Public Accounts Committee 1998) 
The 1997/8 figures take account of new measures recommended by the 
NAO, resulting in reduced costs for environmental evaluation, reduced 
                                                 
18
 It was observed from the data that some management agreements in Stage I and II 
ESAs were terminated after the initial five-year period, rather than maintained across 
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costs for compliance monitoring, greater efficiencies in RSCs and the 
additional new agreements made in the Stage III and IV ESAs, which 
were launched relatively recently (and thus would be expected to have 
proportionately higher administrative costs than the older ESAs).  Cost 
reductions are now being made, but questions remain with regard to the 
consequent effects on the quality and competence of remaining 
administrative operations.  A best practice review of the RSCs has been 
undertaken, and the head-quarters policy branch of MAFF involved in 
ESA development has been reduced in size. In addition, scheme 
development activities are to be combined for the ESA scheme and the 
Countryside Stewardship Scheme, saving some costs.  Substantial 
savings are also being made through reduction of the environmental 
monitoring programme, for example, by concentrating on extensive 
monitoring rather than intensive botanical surveys.  The five-year cycle 
of evaluating the four Stages of ESAs ends this year, with scope for 
subsequent rationalisation.  Costs are predicted to fall from £3.3m in 
1995/6, to £2.2m in 1996/7, £1.5m in 1997/8 and £0.7m in 1998/9. 
 
Take-up rates in some ESAs have been lower than intended by MAFF, 
giving rise to higher average annual administrative costs per hectare and 
per agreement as the fixed scheme costs cannot be spread so broadly.  
Project officers now promote the scheme more proactively (Harrison, 
MAFF, pers.comm), for example, through targeting areas affected by 
environmental degradation, with project officers initiating visits to 
farmers rather than waiting for expressions of interest or applications for 
entry to be made.  The NAO (1997) suggested that MAFF should 
identify priority areas within each ESA and focus field inspections and 
                                                                                                                                            
the whole ten-years. 
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its environmental monitoring work on them, directing resources to where 
the benefits are likely to be greatest19.  However, such pro-activity 
impacts on the running costs of the scheme.  A much greater proportion 
of field inspections could be targeted on those agreement holders who 
represent the greatest risk; this should permit reductions in checking 
levels without reducing the effectiveness of compliance monitoring. 
 
Stewart et al. (1997) also made several recommendations to improve the 
benefit-delivery of ESAs: increase advice and support facilities, which 
they considered to be lacking in many areas, and improve the co-
ordination between farmers and environmental organisations and the 
government to increase take-up.  In particular, promotional activities can 
play extremely important roles.  The socio-economic survey results 
found that the reluctance to move to higher management tiers was 
explained by perceived difficulties in complying with the more 
demanding or restrictive prescriptions, or because of the impression that 
payment levels offered inadequate compensation.  However, scheme 
participation had increased awareness of environmental issues. 
 
The next step is to consider the re-design of agri-environmental policy 
mechanisms.  For example, using a greater differentiation of payment 
rates  to  take  account  of  the  varying  compliance  costs  of  scheme  
participants, and to tie payments more closely to environmental 
performance,  perhaps  using  some  form  of  competitive  bidding.   The  
problem is that the introduction of more targeted schemes, with 
management prescriptions tailored more precisely to the conditions of 
                                                 
19
 It was also suggested that areas with poor take-up could be removed from ESA 
designations and Countryside Stewardship used instead to protect and improve the 
 55 
individual sites, will undoubtedly increase administrative costs (although 
with the aim of increasing environmental benefits too).  It may be the 
case that public administrative costs and participant compensation 
payments are to some degree substitutes for each other, so an area for 
further research relates to their relationship, and how direct and how 
linear any trade-offs are.  Hence the utility of knowledge of the costs of 
simpler mechanisms such as uniform payments as a starting point.  There 
may or may not be a pay-off from increasing the targeting of payments 
under agri-environmental schemes. 
 
Furthermore, given at least some joint production of, for example, 
stonewalls and landscape, co-ordinated action by all land-owners in the 
area is needed.  How could this be achieved?  So far little has been 
achieved in this area of policy-making.  The development of farmer 
networks could be promoted, to attempt to achieve conservation 
improvements from peer-pressure and better information (through 
sharing knowledge) on conservation land management, before moving to 
collective management agreements (for example, with a premium to 
encourage participation) (see MacFarlane & Smith 1998).  Collective 
management agreements, for example, under the existing ESA model, 
will in all likelihood entail greater administrative costs than individual 
management agreements, but hopefully at a lower cost than those for 
common land, as all participants’ objectives are aligned (given the 
voluntary nature of the scheme).  There was some evidence that in ESAs, 
extra administrative costs arose from the need to co-ordinate farmers’ 
participation in relation to common land entry for ESAs. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
environment (NAO 1997). 
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Much more detail of individual schemes and administering units is 
needed for precise recommendations to be made for practical 
administrative efficiency improvements.  However, to summarise, there 
are a number of general options that might perhaps allow administrative 
economies to be made, particularly given the likely increasing 
importance of administrative costs with greater reliance on the use of 
management-agreement approaches in the future: 
 
• build on existing institutions when developing policy to reduce costs 
in absolute terms, given the largely fixed costs of developing scheme 
implementation frameworks 
• reduce the frequency of participant monitoring through the 
introduction of penalties for non-compliance (see Russell 1990) 
• increase scheme promotional activities, so participants have a better 
understanding of the management requirements; this may also mean a 
reduced need for compliance activities. 
• increased understanding through greater information may improve 
attitudes, compliance and increase interest in scheme participation; 
also more likely to reap economies of scale 
• shift some administrative activities such as farm mapping and 
reporting onto participants? 
• contract out some routine administrative activities through 
competitive tendering to reduce costs 
• consider the establishment of ‘one-stop shops’ for agri-environmental 
schemes, to allow economies to be made in relation to the private 
costs of participation.  Movement has been made towards one-stop 
shops in Scotland. 
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• introduce the joint administration of agricultural support and agri-
environmental schemes (particularly using the Integrated 
Administration and Control system) 
 
The agri-environmental policy arena is a very dynamic environment, and 
recommendations need really to be specific, if they are to increase 
efficiency, given the heterogeneity of existing implementation structures 
for agri-environmental policies and the need to work within these.  Given 
the link between the demand for some administrative activities and 
scheme participation levels (for example, for compliance monitoring), 
forecasting needs to be improved if budgeted allowances are to be 
appropriate.  However, agri-environmental policies are only one 
component of a much larger economic system; it is only really possible 
to tinker on the edges, although small adjustments may be useful (for 
example, achieved through changes in specific property rights).  Agri-
environmental concerns must be kept in perspective. 
 
5.3. Scheme Value for Money 
 
The underlying issue relates to the identification of the best way to 
achieve agri-environmental  objectives.  Hence the real interest lies in the 
change that a given policy, through its attendant expenditure, can 
achieve: the environmental benefits flowing from a given amount of 
expenditure on compensation and scheme organisation.  It is 
unrewarding to discuss transactions costs in the abstract: ultimately, 
analysis must be related to the policy objectives and the extent of their 
achievement if decisions are to be made to maximise economic 
efficiency in resource allocation.  However, full cost-benefit assessment 
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is very complex.  Even if we knew what changes were occurring in the 
countryside and the rural environment, there are problems in linking 
cause and effect, given the multitude of different policies and economic 
forces at work.  It is almost impossible to untangle consequences with 
any great level of certainty.  Moreover, given data limitations, most 
analysis of benefits and costs has to be conducted on the basis of 
averages rather than focusing on the margins. 
 
A clear distinction between financial analysis and broader economic 
analysis is crucial in work such as this on administrative-costs.  The view 
is often that administration is something that should be minimised rather 
than having a productive economic function. Administrative 
arrangements such as agri-environmental schemes can provide useful 
mechanisms through which to resolve resource use conflicts, for 
example, relating to public goods in the countryside. Thus, ideally, we 
would like to know how the amounts spent on agri-environmental 
schemes in terms of compensation and administration relate to improving 
environmental quality and social welfare, as compared to the ‘policy-off’ 
situation.  However, full cost-benefit assessment is prohibitively 
complex.  Even if we knew exactly what physical changes were 
occurring in the countryside and the rural environment, where, and when, 
there are problems in linking cause and effect, given the multitude of 
different policies, in some cases overlapping / conflicting, and other 
economic and natural forces at work.   
 
MAFF evaluates the environmental monitoring data for ESAs to inform 
its ESA review every five years.  Quantitative indicators are used such as 
the percentage uptake by farmers, trends in wildlife populations and 
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numbers of key landscape features such as hedges, trees and historic 
buildings. So far it appears that the wildlife conservation interest of the 
[English] ESAs has in general been maintained, compared with the rapid 
deterioration prior to ESA designation (Stewart et al., 1997: 123).   
However, there have been some problems, such as the small increase in 
arable farming on non-agreement land in the Somerset Levels and Moors 
and the Pennine Dales, and small scattered losses since 1987 of some 
landscape features such as walls, trees and barns.  A common criticism of 
the ESA scheme in England has been that it has merely, in most areas, 
maintained the status quo (which, after all, was largely what it was 
designed to do) rather than achieving much tangible environmental 
improvement.  It is possible that increasing the stringency of 
management prescriptions could enhance cost-effectiveness, although the 
extra negotiation and enforcement costs of such changes must be 
considered too; the situation is one of ‘no gain without pain’.  In 
addition, participation would be expected to be lower. 
 
In addition to the methodological problems associated with 
environmental monitoring, there are conceptual issues in relation to 
benefit measurement: for example, is the maintenance of the status quo 
really a benefit to society or not?  The answer depends what would have 
happened in the absence of the policy, and depends on the perspective 
taken, using the notion of the ‘reference point’ (Bromley & Hodge 1990).  
Still, it is important to stress the potential benefits of administrative 
expenditure in the agri-environmental policy sphere: after all, the 
intention of government intervention is to increase social welfare.  
However, for this to occur, greater care is needed to ensure that the 
administrative activities undertaken are the most appropriate ones.  
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Given few market forces and little competition to supply services in the 
administrative sphere, there are relatively few checks and balances on 
inefficiencies; vigilance is needed. 
 
Despite a number of environmental valuation studies (see Stewart et al. 
1997), there are still few estimates of environmental benefits of 
countryside stewardship policies, and those estimates in the literature are 
not beyond controversy.  There are a number of substantial challenges to 
applications of cost-benefit analysis: for example, related to the fact that 
benefits are usually expressed in studies as per household or per 
individual, when per-hectare measures of benefits would be more useful 
for policy development (for example, with regard to assessing the 
economics of areal extension of ESAs), especially at the margin.  The 
production of environmental benefits following the conclusion of 
contracts between farmers and governments with regard to the promised 
changes in management is typically subject to both uncertainty and time 
lags (for example, the effect of reducing stocking rates on heather 
moorland recovery).  The next step, linking the organisational costs to 
the achievement of the policy objectives is a subject for future work. 
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6. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
This study has highlighted the costs of scheme organisation, with some 
attempt to explain costs in relation to scheme structure and 
implementation, in terms, for example, of different ESA characteristics 
and participation levels.  Of interest are the implications of this analysis 
for agri-environmental policy development.  ESAs are costly to 
administer, but public scheme expenditure varies significantly over 
individual ESAs, RSCs and time.  Several explanatory factors have been 
identified here.   
 
The econometric analysis suggested that the incremental and cumulative 
numbers of agreements are important determinants of costs, as expected 
given that management agreements require two-way interactions between 
landholders and the administering agency.  There also appears to be 
some scope for economies of scale related to scheme participation, 
perhaps implying that larger, more general schemes could be more 
efficient (or at least cheaper to implement) than a string of smaller 
schemes focused on particular agri-environmental aspects or localities.  
However, administrative costs were observed to vary greatly across the 
ESAs even when participation levels were taken into account, implying 
that there are a number of other factors to consider. 
 
The time since the ESA was first designated was found to be an 
important explanatory variable for cost indicators.  However, it is 
impossible at present to untangle ‘experience’ and fine-tuning effects 
from participation-related economies of scale effects.  Given that it is far 
more expensive to establish agreements than to maintain them; the set-up 
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costs should be considered as an investment, and the life-span of the 
‘asset’ (natural capital, and perhaps information relating to its 
maintenance) should be considered in relation to these costs.  Agencies 
should try to keep successful agreements running for as long as possible, 
and also build on them, incrementally, perhaps under an umbrella agri-
environmental scheme rather than starting negotiations afresh for 
individual schemes.  Certainly participants should be discouraged from 
‘holidaying’, i.e., terminating the agreement for a few years and reverting 
to previous (more intensive) farming practices, before re-entering the 
scheme.  Such breaks would be very inefficient, both administratively 
and environmentally.  There is also substantial investment in human 
capital as a result of the transacting process: loss of this should be 
avoided where possible; the continuity of the relationship between 
farmers and project officers is very valuable and a long-term perspective 
should be encouraged for both project officers and participants.   
 
Some level of administrative transactions costs are both inevitable and 
necessary if externalities are to be reduced through policy 
implementation.  However, although policy organisation can demand a 
substantial share of the total gross public cost of policies, the costs are 
often overlooked.  They may be sufficiently important to constrain the 
resources available for implementing such policies, especially in times of 
public expenditure scrutiny and cut-back. Greater transparency with 
regard to administrative costs is required as a safeguard against 
inappropriate public policy spending and lower levels of overall social 
welfare than might otherwise be possible.  Another issue is the fact that 
administrative costs are important as policy administration is the only 
element of the costs of agri-environmental schemes that must be borne 
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entirely at the member-state level, even when the policy is to fulfil EU 
requirements (the costs of compensating land-owners may be re-
imbursed partly from the EU under Regulation 2078/92).  Consequently, 
these financial arrangements may mean that some member-states are 
constrained in developing their agri-environmental frameworks, perhaps 
lending support to the argument that perhaps support should be available 
from Brussels for the administrative as well as the compensatory aspects 
of agri-environmental schemes.  The financial arrangement may also 
have significant economic aspects through creating incentives for 
member-states to favour, to some degree, low-TC but high 
compensation-cost policies (as compensation costs may be reimbursed at 
either a 50% or 75% rate from the EU).  Consequently, potentially 
inefficient policy in terms of overall value for money may result, as 
member states target policies to a much lower level. 
 
Agri-environmental policies are still in their infancy and need rational 
development, i.e., with regard to their transactional costs as well as to 
their other costs.  High transactional costs will check their progress; 
however, it is very difficult, at present, to assess ways of reducing costs, 
especially as the policy context is so dynamic.  It must be stressed that it 
is still an early stage for scheme evaluation.  Furthermore, it is essential 
not to lose sight of the underlying goals of policies, namely 
environmental improvements, whilst (perhaps) maintaining farm income. 
 
There are questions relating not just to the levels of administrative 
expenditures on agri-environmental schemes, but also to the mix of 
activities funded by such expenditures.   Trade-offs will in all likelihood 
be required: scope for economising in one area will be balanced by 
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increased requirements in another.  Furthermore, different systems will 
be more or less appropriate to achieve different objectives, in terms of 
resource re-allocations.  Organisational costs may well become of even 
greater importance in the future as policy objectives and the mechanisms 
used to achieve them evolve.  Budgets should be set in the light of 
information on the full public costs of such policies, particularly in the 
context of proposed changes in the mix of schemes under Agenda 2000.  
There appeared to be an effect on administrative costs of the coincidence 
of ESA and Less Favoured Area designations: the increase in costs 
associated with this overlap may have important implications for the 
costs of any future ‘green’ LFA payments, as has been suggested by the 
countryside  agencies in the UK in the context of Agenda 2000.  In terms 
of more short-term agri-environmental policy developments, it appears 
from the econometric analysis that the extra per-hectare administrative 
costs of extending an ESA, in terms of the eligible area, are not very 
high.  However, it is necessary to assess the likely participation changes 
resulting, and the associated budget implications of having to make extra 
compensation payments too. 
 
Greater knowledge of a number of aspects touched on only lightly here 
would improve future analysis.  For example, participant attitudes could 
have a very important link to public administrative costs; positive 
attitudes towards conservation could reduce the overall transactions costs 
(both public and private) of establishing management agreements as 
there would be less conflict between conservation and farmer objectives.  
Less promotion and persuasion would be needed too, and perhaps less 
enforcement effort, given lower levels of non-compliance.  The dynamic 
setting of this analysis and agri-environmental schemes more generally 
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must be borne in mind.  In particular, it is hypothesised that the mere 
existence of schemes may help to bring farming and conservation 
objectives more in line over time, hence scheme establishment and 
running should become easier as consensus as to its aims grows. 
Furthermore, some experience of management agreements now, on both 
sides to the negotiation, may provide knowledge useful for economising 
on the transactions costs of such agreements (in the same or in different 
contexts, in future). 
 
The next question is whether or not there are any wider implications of 
this analysis.  Scheme-related transactions costs would be expected to 
depend to a large degree on scheme type; one particular policy, based on 
voluntary management agreements in exchange for compensation, has 
been examined here.  The analysis is not immediately applicable to other 
policies such as land nationalisation, for which there may be a high 
degree of intervention and public expenditure, while the transactions 
costs may or may not be large, depending on whether or not land to be 
nationalised is acquired through compulsory purchase rather than 
voluntary transfer.  Generally, too, several types of policy instrument are 
combined in the overall agri-environmental framework: advice, 
education, financial incentives and mandatory management requirements 
(particularly in specified areas such as Nitrate Vulnerable Zones).  
Evaluation of individual schemes must be placed in the broader context 
and take account of its dynamics 20. 
 
                                                 
20
 See Falconer & Whitby (1999) with regard to a trans-European evaluation of 
transactions costs for agri-environmental schemes. 
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Given that some level of administrative intervention is deemed necessary 
due to the failures of the free market to allocate resources optimally, have 
we chosen the optimal institutional mix?  While ESAs have overcome a 
traditional division between landscape protection and nature 
conservation, catering also for archaeological concerns, the scheme still 
falls short of a fully-integrated approach to environmental management.  
Clearly we have not yet reached a fully-evolved agri-environmental 
policy framework.  Further development is likely, and the message of 
this study is that the administrative cost implications should be 
considered as an integral part of public policy decision-making. 
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